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1. Introduction 
Monetary policy and inflation in Georgia in the years 1996-1998 are the subject 
of this paper. As it is written in the middle of 1997, the discussed period is in a natural 
way divided into two parts: past and future. Correspondingly, first sections of the 
paper deal with facts which have already occurred and with their interpretation, while 
the remaining sections contain some projections that the authors tried to make for the 
future. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2. describes the framework in which 
the monetary policy of Georgia is conducted. The first part of this section names the 
monetary authority, shortly sketches the legal and political framework in which it 
operates and lists the instruments which it can use. The second part concentrates on the 
IMF’s ESAF program which is implemented in Georgia since 1996 and will be 
continued until 1998, and which tightly constraints the acceptable monetary policy 
range. The discussion of this program revolves around its two core (and sometimes 
inconsistent) macroeconomic elements: the quantitative performance criteria and the 
exchange rate policy. Section 3. discusses two characteristic features of the Georgian 
economy that were inherited from the hyperinflation period 1993-1994: low money 
multiplier and low monetization. Low money multiplier is directly related to the 
situation in the banking sector, which is thus also sketched. Low monetization is an 
indirect indicator of a whole set of factors. While discussing it we resort to recent 
literature on this problem and to international comparisons contained in it. Section 4 is 
of a more descriptive nature: it presents the past behavior of money supply and of the 
exchange rate in a chronological fashion, but attempts to interpret the observed 
phenomena are also made. 
Section 5 opens the forward looking part of the paper: it characterizes prospects 
for the future for M2 and real output. Section 6 sketches the econometric modeling 
strategy which the authors applied for Georgia. The constructed model has been used 
to obtain forecasts of inflation and nominal GDP, on the basis of assumed scenarios of 
money supply and the real output. The forecasts for 1997 H2 - 1998 (the remaining 
part of the discussed period) are presented in section 7. Finally, some conclusions are 
drawn in section 8. Technical details of the estimations can be found in the Appendix. 
2. Framework for Monetary Policy in Georgia 
2.1. Monetary Authorities and Instruments of Monetary Policy 
Monetary policy is conducted by the National Bank of Georgia (NBG), with the 
statutory goal of securing the purchasing power of the national currency and the 
stability of the banking and payment system
1. The bank acts in conditions of full 
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independence from the government
2. The President and the Council of the bank, as 
well as every year’s General Directions of Monetary Policy are approved by the 
Parliament. 
From time to time the Parliament exerts pressure for softening the monetary 
policy and banking system reform policies. The acting President and the Council of 
the NBG have not been approved for a long time
3. Mr. Nodar Javahishvili, who has 
been heading the Bank since the end of 1993
4 and is known as a decided supporter of 
market reforms, failed to obtain the Parliament’s acceptance in April 1997 (the first 
time when the issue of Parliament approval was tackled) and the next vote was 
postponed indefinitely. In the somewhat uncertain situation the leadership of the 
Central Bank manages to withstand political pressure. The growth of Domestic Assets 
of the NBG is broadly in line with the IMF’s recommendations. 
The main instrument which the NBG has at its disposal is the intervention (sales 
and purchases of foreign currency) at the Tbilisi Interbank Currency Exchange 
(TICEX). Other instruments, less effective in the current conditions, are the required 
reserve ratio and activity on Interbank Credit Auctions. The government bonds market 
is in an early stage of development. The total issue planned for 1997 amounts only to 
10 mln. lari, so this instrument is not effective as of 1997, and this will not change 
much in 1998. 
2.2. ESAF Program 
The rate of tax and customs collection in Georgia is, at 8.1% of GDP in 1996 
[IMF (1997), p.4], among the lowest in the FSU. Government expenditures (at 13.9% 
of GDP [ibid.]), although shrunk to hardly sustainable levels, exceed the revenues 
significantly. Thus, net government savings are negative. Private net savings are 
probably also negative. As a result, Georgia has a large current account deficit, which 
in 1996 amounted to about -7.7% of GDP [ibid., p.82]
5. In the presence of the serious 
fiscal and external imbalance, the ability of the monetary authorities to control 
inflation and prevent depreciation is mainly confined to an external support. 
Implementation of the IMF designed structural adjustment program plays a crucial role 
in applying for the support. 
On February 28, 1996 Georgia entered into an Enhanced Structural Adjustment 
Facility (ESAF)
6 arrangement with the IMF. During the 3 year program Georgia will 
                                              
2 Law on National Bank of Georgia, Art. 3. 
3 Managers of the former state banks (so far none of these banks is eligible for obtaining a 
license) are lobbying for a cheap credit and against bank licensing, so the present Central Bank 
leadership is unacceptable for them. 
4 He took this post after the mysterious death of his predecessor, Demur Dvalishvili, who was 
responsible for an unprecedented extending of Central Bank credit and, partly, the resulting 1993-1994 
hyperinflation. 
5 Both trade and GDP data are extremely inexact. The IMF estimates the nominal GDP for 1996 
at 5724 mln. lari and the current account balance at -350 mln. dollars [IMF (1997b), p.4], and the State 
Department of Statistics at 5123 mln. lari and -300 mln. dollars respectively. 
6 ESAF is a 3 year arrangement in which the recipient country obtains concessional financing, 
under the condition that it realizes a comprehensive Structural Adjustment program, designed under 
the IMF supervision. ESAF is designed for low income countries (with per capita GDP less than 905 M. Jarociński, A. Jirny 
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obtain 166.5 mln. SDR (i.e., 150% of its quota), 55.5 mln. SDR each year (at the rate 
of 1.35 USD/SDR it amounts to 75 mln. USD). The disbursements are conditional on 
implementation of comprehensive structural reform policies. The implementation is 
evaluated periodically in terms of compliance with a set of structural and quantitative 
performance criteria. 
Structural performance criteria concern a legislative reform and institutional 
reform of the economy, public finance sphere and the banking sector. Thus they 
determine prospects for the real growth which influences money demand, internal and 
external stability which concerns directly the inflation and the exchange rate, and the 
prospects for the money multiplier and monetization growth. The quantitative 
performance criteria and indicative targets define the possible monetary policy range. 
2.2.1. Program Targets 
According to the usual ESAF framework
7, the IMF sets ceiling on the growth of 
Net Domestic Assets of the NBG, which comprise mainly credit to the government 
and, to a lesser extent, to commercial banks. A floor is set for Net International 
Reserves (Net Foreign Assets ￿ NFA) of the NBG. Reserve Money which is equal to 
the sum of the NFA and NDA is thus constrained. In particular, it cannot grow as a 
result of excessive financing of the government budget deficit, or fall at the cost of 
excessive depletion of Gross International Reserves. In terms of monetary policy 
objectives, this controls inflation and secures the currency stability. 
As for the latter component of Net Domestic Assets, the NBG gives credit to 
banks only under strict conditions, and the amount of this credit was insignificant in 
1996 and the first half of 1997
8. The credit to the government is already constrained 
very tightly in the Law on National Bank
9, but this article has not yet been 
implemented. For the period of the ESAF program it was suspended by a special 
decision of the Parliament, in order to allow the IMF loans to be channeled through the 
NBG lending to the government. 
Consecutive ESAF loan tranches are disbursed semiannually on an account in the 
NBG, increasing the stock of Gross Foreign Reserves. In the program years budget 
deficits (1996 and 1997 budgets and 1998 budget project), the amount of National 
Bank credit is adjusted to the amount of ESAF financing. Thus, the NBG is in a 
position to sterilize the impact of lending to the government on reserve money. It does 
                                                                                                                                             
USD in 1995), and the financing comes in a form of loans with 0.5% interest rate, 5 years grace, 10 
years maturity, to a maximum amount of 190% of the country’s quota in the IMF. [IMF Internet site, 
Fact sheets, The IMF concessional financing through ESAF]. 
7 See IMF (1987), IMF (1997a). 
8 The maximum term of the loan is 3 months and it has to be properly secured [Law on the 
National Bank of Georgia, Art. 33]. The net claims on banks have fluctuated between 2,5 and 13 mln. 
lari (source: Accounts of the NBG 1995-1997), their size and duration proofs that the NBG credit has 
been solely an instrument of liquidity management of the banks and not the means of crediting the 
economy. 
9 Maximum term of the credit to the Ministry of Finance is 6 months. It should not exceed 5% 
(under certain conditions it can be extended to 8%) of average annual budget revenues. [Law on the 
National Bank of Georgia, with corrections from September 19, 1995 and May 28, 1996, Art. 57] Monetary Policy and Inflation in Georgia 1996-1998 
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so by intervening on the currency market, buying back the laries it lent for the dollars 
from ESAF loan. 
 
2.2.2. Exchange Rate Policy and Its Role in the Program 
In December 1996, following the liberalization of the exchange rate regime, 
Georgia declared that it had met the rules of the Article VIII of the IMF Articles of 
Agreement. Thus, the lari is fully convertible for current account transactions. The 
official exchange rate is determined daily on the Tbilisi Interbank Exchange Market 
(TICEX). The exchange rate regime is classified as a managed float and, as stated 
above, the NBG intervenes almost permanently on the account of IMF loans to prevent 
a fast depreciation, otherwise a danger, considering the existing inflation and the 
current account deficit. 
A stable exchange rate plays a key role in the Georgian economic program. It 
is crucial for public confidence in the national currency and in the whole reform policy 
of the government. Also, it puts a constraint on inflation. Since 1994 the authorities 
and the IMF seem strongly committed to resisting the depreciation below the 
psychologically important threshold of 1.3 lari/USD. In the first half of 1997, while 
defending this rate, the NBG let its International Reserves fall below the program 
targets. Because of this commitment, in practice the exchange rate can be treated as 
fixed, or fluctuating within a narrow band. This has crucial consequences for 
interpreting Georgia’s monetary policy: in a small open economy operating under a 
fixed exchange rate there is no control over the money supply. It fluctuates in line with 
the demand, determined both by internal developments and by foreign trade balance 
which determines the demand for foreign currency. Also, as long as the exchange rate 
stays quasi-fixed, the compliance with the ESAF target will depend only on the extent 
to which it is realistic, taking into account the money demand developments. 
3. Heritage of the Past 
Together with most other transition economies, soon after gaining independence 
Georgia went through the period of economic instability and high inflation. The 
annual rate of inflation amounted to 1178.5% in 1992, 7484.1% in 1993 and 6473.6% 
in 1994 [Ghosh (1997), p.6]. The economic situation was exacerbated by general 
chaos and armed conflicts. With returning political stability, a successful stabilization 
program was launched in 1994 [Wellisz (1996), p.8]. Tight monetary policy and fixing 
of the exchange rate for over half a year led to an exceptional success in fighting 
inflation, which dropped to 57% in 1995 and 13.8% in 1996. However, the turbulent 
period left persistent traces on monetary characteristics of Georgian economy. 
3.1. Money Multiplier and the Banking Sector 
During the hyperinflation period population’s bank savings were eaten up by 
inflation. In addition to that, several bank frauds happened. The heritage of these 
developments is a low confidence in the banking system. As a result, the level of bank 
deposits is extremely low. With regard to lending, after the difficult period bank 
portfolios consisted mainly of bad loans. A set of comprehensive measures has been M. Jarociński, A. Jirny 
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taken to strengthen the banking sector
10. Among other measures, prudential 
regulations were introduced and most of uncomplying banks were closed. The 
remaining banks undertake little credit activity. The quality of the banking system 
is still low and this is reflected in a high spread between average deposit and lending 
interest rates (according to the calculations of Georgian Economic Trends it amounted 
to about 50% (percentage points) in the beginning of 1996, and about 40% (percentage 
points) in the middle of 1997). The margin is decreasing, but it is still high. 
Another sign of the unhealthy state of the banking sector is the high dollarization 
ratio (calculated as a share of foreign currency deposits in the banking system to the 
domestic currency ones). This indicator fluctuates around the level of 50% and shows 
no diminishing trend. What is most worrying is that banks tend to offer higher interest 
rates on dollar deposits, than for lari
11. This means that they are not interested in 
working in the national currency. 
As a result of the situation in the banking sector, the money multiplier is very 
low, i.e., the broad money is not much bigger than the monetary base (see Table 1., 
Figure 1. and 2.). Money creation by the banking sector is proportional to the level of 
financial intermediation, which in Georgia is very low. In the extreme case when no 
credits are given, the multiplier value goes down to 1. But actually, in Georgia the 
multiplier calculated as a ratio of M2 aggregate to the Reserve Money (comprising the 
currency in circulation plus all kinds of deposits that commercial banks hold in the 
Central Bank) was less then 1 for much of the 1996 (in the whole year it was 1 on 
average). Thus, the banking sector performed money shrinking instead of money 
creation. It is paradoxical from the point of view of a normal banking business, but 
banks often held more money in vaults (so it is not included in M2) and on accounts in 
NBG (which do not bear any interest), than they received in form of deposits from the 
customers. This is how the multiplier can be even smaller than 1. 
3.1.1. Why the Money Multiplier was Smaller Than 1 
There are two types of balances held by the banks in the Central Bank: the 
required (obligatory) reserves, and the voluntary reserves held on correspondent 
accounts. The required reserves are held on the account of the customers deposits. The 
reserve requirement has been reduced from 20% to 18% in January 1996, to 15% in 
September 1996, and should be reduced further to 12% before the end of 1997. 
Regardless of the reductions, it is rather high. The first reduction apparently had no 
effect on the multiplier. However, the multiplier started to grow in the fourth quarter 
of 1996, which could be associated with the second reduction, although the figures are 
too volatile to draw any firm conclusions. 
As for the balances on correspondent accounts, they are used for clearing inter-
bank transactions. The size of these balances is large in Georgia. In 1996 they were on 
average 30% higher than the required reserves, although, especially for individual 
banks, their volatility is very high. There are two reasons for the large size of these 
balances. First, inter-bank payments are very slow. Second, in the difficult economic 
                                              
10 The issue of a banking sector reform is always accentuated in the IMF adjustment programs 
[IMF Internet site, Fact sheets, Banking System Soundness]. 
11 GET 2
nd quarter 1997, forthcoming. Monetary Policy and Inflation in Georgia 1996-1998 
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conditions both long term depositors and attractive lending opportunities are scarce, 
and a large share of banks activity constituted payment services for firms
12. 
The liquidity management of some of the banks can be imperfect (although after 
a certification process only 55 of the best banks are left from over 200), but most of 
the deposits are short term ones, and this is the reason for the high cash holdings. 
Finally, the high dollarization ratio together with the fact that the reserve requirement 
for foreign currency deposits must be met in lari explain how the banking system 
shrunk the amount of domestic money. 
3.2. Monetization 
Monetization of an economy is usually defined as the ratio of a money aggregate 
to annualized GDP in current prices (a reverse ratio gives money velocity). This 
measure shows how much money circulates in the economy. It is a useful indicator of 
money supply and demand interactions, as well as the depth of financial markets and 
the degree of intermediation [De Broeck et al. (1997), p.6, Ghosh (1997), p.12]. It 
conveys information which is important from the point of view of the monetary policy. 
When monetization is low, there are poorer prospects for collecting sustainable 
seignorage
13 revenue. More generally, lower monetization leads to less stability, 
because a given nominal change in the quantity of money constitutes a bigger relative 
change. Therefore, prices and exchange rates are more vulnerable to monetary shocks 
and confidence outflows. 
The monetization of the Georgian economy is extremely low (see Table 1.) as a 
result of the hyperinflation of 1993-1994. For M2 the average annualized monetization 
in the 4 quarters of 1996 was 3.2% (or velocity equal to 31) [De Broeck et al. (1997), 
p.37]. People learned to live without holding domestic money which kept loosing its 
value. Currency substitution has not been fully reversed. An unmeasurable, but 
certainly large amount of dollars is still in circulation, and occasionally they are even 
used for day to day transactions, apart from their obvious purpose as a savings 
instrument. In some border areas Russian rubles are used along with the lari. There is 
also an obvious link between monetization and the money multiplier. Other countries’ 
experience confirms that when the banking system is more efficient and credible, the 
money multiplier is higher and the level of monetization is also higher (see Figure 3.). 
Recent studies of the FSU countries show that, although monetization falls fast 
with inflation growth, a kind of a ￿ratchet effect￿ happens and the process is not 
symmetrically reversed when inflation decreases. Atish R. Ghosh [Ghosh (1997), 
p.10] points out that although the average annual inflation in those countries fell from 
1000% in 1994 to 296% in 1995 and 53% in 1996, the average monetization actually 
fell in 1995. In 1996 it grew only slightly and even this result is questionable, as the 
GDP recovery happened mostly in the unregistered sector and is not properly 
measured. Ghosh’s regression analysis shows, that elasticity of money demand with 
respect to inflation is high during demonetization, but very low or insignificant during 
remonetization [Ghosh (1996), Ghosh (1997)]. The author points to a threshold annual 
                                              
12 In many banks revenues from commissions and fees exceeded normal interest profits. 
13 Seignorage is a revenue of a state from printing money. Real seignorage is defined as: [M(t)-
M(t-1)]/P(t), where M means monetary base and P ￿ price level. M. Jarociński, A. Jirny 
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inflation rate of 6% (!), below which remonetization is likely to happen. The 
interpretation of these observations is that households learn to avoid holding money 
and even after the original incentives disappear, they stick by inertia to the acquired 
habits [Ghosh (1997), p.12]. 
Authors of another study of velocity in the FSU countries [De Broeck et al. 
(1997), p.31] also detect a change in the nature of the real money demand after 
stabilization is reached. This leads to a similar conclusion: that the pace of 
remonetization, even in conditions of low inflation, is incomparable with the pace of 
the preceding demonetization. The authors argue that the cumulative inflation from 
1992 until stabilization is a main determinant of money velocity in the FSU countries. 
Indeed, Georgia with a price index of 112184.4 is much worse than even Ukraine 
(42453.9), Armenia (38656.2) and Kazakhstan (15995.0), and its monetization is also 
lowest. Finally, the historical experience of Germany, Austria and Bolivia after 
hyperinflation episodes reviewed in IMF (1997b) [IMF (1997b), Appendix IV] 
suggests, that remonetization usually progresses only very gradually. 
Georgia has made a remarkable progress towards normalization of the monetary 
situation. In October 1995, after a prolonged period of a fixed exchange rate and a 
diminishing inflation, a new national currency ￿ the lari ￿ was introduced. This step 
met with wide public acceptance, which led to a significant increase in the 
monetization of the economy. The remonetization happened at the cost of ruble and, to 
a lesser extent, dollar holdings. In 1996 M2 grew by about 38% which with the 
estimated real GDP growth of 11% and inflation of 13,8% implies a 9% increase in the 
willingness of economic agents to hold domestic currency. In light of the studies 
quoted above it is doubtful that further progress will be so fast in the near future. The 
unexpectedly fast money growth stopped for the first half of 1997. 
Further remonetization will be conditional on consolidating the attained stability. 
Thus, it will depend on a cautious management of the NBG gross international 
reserves, which serve as a cushion for shocks. Progress in banking sector reform is 
another important factor for money demand growth. A healthy banking system 
increases portfolio demand for (broad) money holding. It should also provide an 
efficient payment system, which would stimulate a switch from foreign currency to the 
domestic one, thus decreasing dollarization of the economy. But even in the most 
optimistic scenario low monetization will remain a characteristic of the Georgian 
economy in the next few years. Monetary Policy and Inflation in Georgia 1996-1998 
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4. Changes in Monetary Aggregates, Inflation        
and the Exchange Rate From the Introduction            
of Lari Until 1997 H1 
4.1. Monetary Aggregates 
4.1.1. Consolidation of the New Currency in 1995 
M2 grew 2.4 times after the successful introduction of lari in October 1995. This 
was caused by a growth of confidence in the new domestic currency and a resulting 
increase in demand. The broad money kept growing at a high rate during the last 
quarter of 1995 (13% in November and 20% in December), as lari was consolidated. 
The Foreign Reserves of the NBG kept increasing: even though the NBG almost 
withheld the interventions on TICEX and in December it was a net buyer of dollars, 
lari appreciated until the end of the year. 
4.1.2. Fast Money Growth in 1996 
The increased supply of domestic currency pushed up consumer prices by about 
3% per month in the first quarter of 1996. This inflation cannot be attributed solely to 
seasonal food price increases, as most of other items grew as well. In January M2 fell 
by 5% and for the rest of the quarter it remained at almost the same level. M2 started 
growing in the second quarter, and the speed of growth of 3% to 8% per month also 
continued in the third quarter, when the NBG dramatically increased its lending to the 
government. The fast money growth was in line with real demand, as inflation fell. 
The average monthly inflation for the 2
nd and the 3
rd quarters was 0.4%, with higher 
inflation in April reversed by a summer seasonal price fall. Increased interventions in 
TICEX in the last quarter and resultant money contraction helped to keep the monthly 
inflation rate around 0.8% till the end of the year, despite of a possible lagged 
influence of the summer expansion. In December there was another increase in the 
money supply, by 11%. 
Annual broad money (M2) growth amounted to 38.3% in 1996. At the same time 
the end year CPI inflation was 13.8%, far below the initial target of 29%. The deficit 
financing was revised upwards by the Parliament, partly because of delays in 
disbursement of the World Bank and European Union support [GET 4
th quarter 1996, 
p.26]. As a result of a policy of sterilization, the Net Foreign Assets of the Central 
Bank fell from about 73 mln. dollars in the end of 1995 to a slightly negative level, 
while, through the use of IMF resources, the gross reserves remained at the constant 
level. 
4.1.3. Money Growth Stagnation in the First Half of 1997 
In the previous two years real GDP fell significantly in the first quarter, and so 
did the money supply. This pattern was continued in 1997. The revenue performance M. Jarociński, A. Jirny 
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in the beginning of the year was poor, so the government reduced its deposits in the 
NBG thus increasing the amount of money in circulation [GET, Statistical Update 
March 1997]. However, the effect was more than netted out by the sterilization. After 
a dip in February (9% fall from December), M2 started growing again and by the end 
of April it regained its level from December 1996, and then fell slightly again. Since 
the seasonal peak in February (2.1%) the monthly inflation fell to its lowest rate since 
the hyperinflation: -1.9% in June, when the influence of the tight monetary policy was 
reinforced by the seasonal fall in food prices. 
Credit to the government (a change in position ￿Net Claims on General 
Government￿ in the NBG balance sheet, corrected by 33.7 mln. lari because of the 
change in accounting convention in March 1997) amounted to 124 mln. lari. The 
source of this credit was the international reserves of the National Bank of Georgia, 
which were used for sterilization. They fell quite dramatically during the same period, 
from -0.5 to -160.1 mln. lari
14.After the first 6 months of 1997, M2 was 1% lower than 
in the end of 1996 and inflation since December 1996 amounted to 3%. 
4.1.4. Main Features of Money Supply Behavior 
Georgia’s money supply is volatile, as in the short run it is determined by 
government finance factors on the one hand, and on the other by the level of NBG 
intervention which depends on the demand for foreign currency (as well as its 
availability). Money supply also seems to follow the seasonal pattern of demand for 
money for transaction needs, as determined by the size of real output. 
4.2. Exchange Rate 
The official lari/dollar exchange rate and the NBG activity on the TICEX are 
presented in Table 3. 
4.2.1. Changes Since the Introduction of the Lari 
During the last quarter of 1995 the new currency was consolidating and it kept 
appreciating (from 1.3 in the period before lari introduction to 1.23 in the end of 
December) in spite of the money expansion. The first depreciation happened in the 
first quarter of 1996, in spite of the sale of 27 mln. dollars by the NBG and a 
consequent reduction of M2 by 4.5%. The temporary increase of imports before the 
removal of some custom duty exemptions is pointed to as a factor that increased the 
demand for foreign currency [Ibid., p.41]. In the second quarter of 1996 the exchange 
rate stabilized around 1.26 and the scale of intervention needed was low. The next 
depreciation happened during the third quarter, possibly as a natural reaction to the 
summer money growth, until the NBG reacted with greater determination in 
September stabilizing the exchange rate at the level of 1.27 and holding it for next two 
months. The retail rate in Foreign Exchange Bureaus (FXB) even reached 1.285 in that 
period which indicated the lack of confidence of the public. 
                                              
14Part of this decline can be attributed to the mentioned change in accounting standards in 
March 1997, but nevertheless the fall is very significant. Monetary Policy and Inflation in Georgia 1996-1998 
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Indeed, defending the lari on the level of 1.27 lari/USD was costly: NBG had to 
sell $44 mln. in September, October and November, compared to the $20 mln total 
intervention needed since March. Factors that undermined market confidence in the 
first place were: high deficit financing, growth of grain imports after foreign aid was 
reduced, and the special seasonal credit for wine factories that Parliament obliged the 
NBG to issue [Ibid., p.40]. In November the Central Bank gave up. The year 1996 
closed with an average rate of 1.28 lari/USD in December. 
In the period from January until May 1997 the rate depreciated gradually to 
almost 1.30 lari/USD while the excess demand for dollars (i.e., the size of NBG 
intervention) remained high. Although it was lower than in the period of defending the 
1.27 lari/USD rate it was about 2.4 times higher on average than in the calm period of 
summer 1996. However, the NBG showed determination to resist depreciation beyond 
the threshold of 1.30 lari/USD, until the summer economic (and probably export) 
revival came and the pressure on the lari subsided. In June the NBG even became a net 
buyer of dollars for the first time since 1995. 
4.2.2. Relation With Balance of Payments and Real Output 
The obvious link between the balance of payments situation and the demand for 
foreign exchange is somewhat hard to identify, as the statistic coverage of 
international trade is extremely poor. In the whole of 1996 the net intervention by the 
Central Bank amounted to $97 mln., whereas the estimated trade deficit was about 
$350 mln.
15. Certainly, apart from unrecorded aid flows, there are a lot of unregistered 
exports and an unknown amount of foreign currency enters Georgia with the return of 
capital flight and remissions from Georgians working abroad. 
It is easier to reconcile the exchange rate developments with monetary changes 
and real output. Obviously, the critical period is the 4
th and the 1
st quarters. In winter 
prices rise, and economic activity slows down. Seasonality resulting from the high 
share of the agriculture sector (over 30%) is reinforced by the persistent energy crisis. 
As a result of this crisis, electricity supplies, which are erratic anyway, are especially 
scarce in the cold period when demand is high. Thus real GDP falls and this results in 
a fall of the real demand for money, switching from lari into dollar holding and a fall 
of the money supply. The process is exacerbated by poor revenue performance in the 
beginning of the year and the resulting increased government needs for Central Bank 
credit. These widen the gap between the money supply and demand, which has to be 
filled by interventions on TICEX. 
4.2.3. Short Run Exchange Rate Policy 
The market is shallow and plagued by big waves of demand for foreign currency 
which are separated by periods when the volume of transactions is low. The NBG 
applies a reasonable policy of optimal management of the resources which are at its 
disposal, giving up gradually when the defense of an exchange rate is too costly (when 
the difference between the TICEX and the street, retail rate is excessive) but trying to 
prevent excessive variation. The Bank’s managers aim to influence the psychology of 
                                              
15 Without aid flows [IMF (1997b), p.4]. The differences between quoted figures are large. M. Jarociński, A. Jirny 
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the market, so that nervous attacks on lari cease to occur, and the national currency 
gains wider acceptance as a means of saving
16. This policy is costly, and it has resulted 
in a decrease of the international reserves. However, close cooperation with the 
international financial organizations and the general success of Georgian economic 
reform sustains the expectation that the balance of payments deficit will be supported 
in emergencies. 
4.2.4. Real Exchange Rates 
In 1996, with 13% annual inflation and about 3.3% nominal depreciation, real 
appreciation of the lari against the dollar amounted to 6%
17. An appreciation is natural 
in conditions of capital inflow and concern about short run export competitiveness 
should be relatively small. An economy which is undergoing deep structural reform 
and quality improvements should in the longer term improve its export performance. 
Developments in the real exchange rate with ruble are influenced mainly by 
Russian economic policies (ruble depreciation) but as of 1996 a slight real 
appreciation of the lari was thought unlikely to have any significant effect on the trade 
balance [GET 4th quarter 1996 p.41]. 
5. Prospects for 1997 H2 and 1998 
5.1. Monetary Indicators 
Given the developments of the first half of 1997, high increases in the monetary 
base seem to be improbable in the rest of the year. However, moderate increase is 
possible, especially taking into account the fact that the NBG should try to rebuild its 
international reserves. The growth should be faster in summer 1997 than in the end of 
the year. The rationale for this pattern is that it should be easier to rebuild reserves in 
summer, when the effect of the increase in money on domestic prices will be partly 
offset by a seasonal drop in inflation. 
In our scenario the main cause of an increase in broad money in 1998 is a growth 
of the money multiplier (M2 divided by the Reserve Money). In June 1997 it was still 
quite low ￿ around 1.04. 
Since both the multiplier and the demand for money depend on the progress of 
reforms, we can think of two scenarios for 1998. In the pessimistic one we assume that 
the general financial system framework stays the same as it was in 1996 and in the first 
half of 1997 and thus, the demand for money growth is explained by the real growth 
and the fall of inflation rate. In the optimistic one we assume that progress of reforms 
will lead to a growth of the money multiplier and to some extra demand for money. 
This extra demand will gradually increase during 1998 and reach 10% of the broad 
money M2 at the end of the year. 
                                              
16 In Abkhasia, where dollars are scarce, people make their savings in lari, even though 
possessing of the Georgian currency is forbidden and subject to punishment. 
17 GET calculations on the basis of FXB lari/USD rate [GET 4
th quarter 1996 p.41]. Monetary Policy and Inflation in Georgia 1996-1998 
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Considering the possible evolution of the monetary aggregates we stuck to a 
general assumption that the monetary and budgetary policy will be kept in accordance 
with the target of maintaining the inflation rate in 1998 not higher than the one in 
1997. 
5.2. Scenario for the Real GDP 
After sustained decline the Georgian economy grew by 2.4% in 1995 and in 
1996 it accelerated to 10.5% (according to the IMF estimates). The revival gradually 
embraces new sectors. In first 6 months of 1997 real GDP was 8.5% higher than in the 
corresponding period of 1996. This increase is only slightly lower than what was 
observed in 1996
18. No substantial changes are expected in this rate in the short term, 
although it is obvious that it is related to the low base from which the growth started 
and thus not sustainable over the longer term. We accept the view that for the whole 
1997 the real growth will amount to 10%. It is also generally agreed that this trend will 
continue in 1998. The actual speed of expansion will depend on various factors. One 
of these will be the degree of improvement in the electricity supply. The current 
situation in that sphere certainly complicates the creation and operation of small 
business. Given the high share of agriculture in total production, weather conditions 
can also significantly influence the economic performance. In the more pessimistic 
scenario we assume an 8% and in the optimistic scenario an 11% increase. 
6. Econometric Modeling of Money Demand          
and Inflation in Georgia 
6.1. Underlying Theory 
The model for forecasting inflation and GDP in Georgia is built on the basis of 
the general theory of money demand. The theory says that the real demand for money 
balances depends on the real income and the opportunity costs of holding money. The 
importance of real income results from the transaction motive for holding money. One 
should expect a positive relation between money demand and real GDP. The 
opportunity cost of holding money is reflected in the first place in the inflation rate 
(high inflation obviously discourages people from keeping money) and the interest 
rate on financial assets that are alternatives to cash. The last variable is not significant 
in Georgia, as the banking system and the financial markets are in an early stage of 
development. 






where M/P is the real money demand, Y denotes real GDP and i ￿ inflation rate. 
                                              
18 In the first half of 1996 real growth over the first half of 1995 was at 9.1%. M. Jarociński, A. Jirny 
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The relationship is assumed to be of the long-run type: it does not hold 
instantaneously, but only after economic agents perceive the changing reality and 
adjust their behaviour to it. If the actual money holdings differ from what is predicted 
by the money demand relationship, a pressure on prices emerges. As the prices adjust, 
the relationship starts to hold again. To apply the above mechanism practically for 
forecasting, we introduce it in the following way: 
Initially the model calculates the equilibrium price level ￿ the CPI predicted by 
the estimated money demand equation. It is derived from the fitted value of this 
equation. Subsequently, the equilibrium price level is introduced into the dynamic 
forecasting equation. So, in the dynamic equation the inflation rate is related to the 
difference between the actual and the equilibrium price levels. This factor proves to be 
statistically significant. In addition, a seasonal variable reflects the summer food price 
falls. Also, we introduce monetary emissions and past values of inflation to account 
for the dynamic influence of monetary shocks and for inertia in the inflation rate. 
The above modeling strategy was originally suggested by Prof. Georges de Menil 
(France), one of the authors of a French quarterly forecasting model. It was used in 
several countries, including countries in transition such as Ukraine
19 and Romania
20, 
and in many cases it showed its efficiency. A detailed description of the model, the 
data used and the statistical results of estimations are given in the Appendix. 
6.2. Construction of Forecasts 
The model allows us to study the relation between the real GDP, money supply 
and inflation. In construction of a forecast the first two variables are taken as 
exogenous, according to an assumed scenario, and the resulting inflation rate is 
obtained (calculating nominal GDP is then straightforward). It is difficult to predict a 
scenario of money supply behavior because the exchange rate can be regarded as fixed 
in the periods when it is defended. In those periods money supply is beyond control 
and the official plans and declarations are mere wishes and guesses. We assume that 
only a falling inflation rate can be reconciled with the exchange rate fixity. Therefore, 
inflation forecasts obtained for different money supply scenarios have been a guideline 
in choosing a plausible money growth rate. Further we present forecasts for scenarios 
that the authors found plausible and which are described above in section 5. 
7. Results of the Forecast 
7.1. Forecast for the Second Half of 1997 
We assume real GDP growth of 10% in 1997 and money growth of only 15%. 
The money growth accelerates in the second half of 1997 as the National Bank of 
                                              
19 Soros International Economic Advisory Group, Memorandum on the nominal GDP, inflation 
and budget revenues forecasting, Kiev, various issues 1996-1997. 
20 Foundation Pro Democratia International Economic Advisory Group, Short run Inflation 
Forecast for the Romanian Economy, Bucharest, May 1997. Monetary Policy and Inflation in Georgia 1996-1998 
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Georgia builds up the international reserves. As a result, annual CPI inflation will 
reach the rate of 8.5%. After a seasonal fall in the summer, prices are supposed to 
grow in an accelerating fashion, caused by the accumulating lagged influence of the 
money growth. Nominal GDP will reach 4189 mln. lari in the second half of the year 
and 6747 in the whole 1997. 
An important feature of the inflation forecast is that monetary policy in the 
second half of 1997 will be crucial for 1998 too. The inflation level which we forecast 
for 1997 is below the original official target of 10-12%. However, taking into account 
the results of the first half of 1997, it is clear that sustaining annual inflation of 12% in 
1997 would mean a sharp increase in prices and monetary aggregates in the second 
half of 1997. It would endanger the stability in 1998, especially in the first quarter, 
when inflationary inertia and lagged influence of monetary emissions would be 
aggravated by seasonal effects in prices. The results in terms of the public confidence 
fall would be very difficult to compensate. 
We reasoned that the authorities understand all the negative aspects of such 
possible policy and that the foreign exchange market will discipline them anyway, so 
that the course of events will be close to our assumptions (8.5% inflation). 
7.2. Forecast for the 1998 
7.2.1. Pessimistic Scenario 
In the pessimistic scenario we assume real GDP growth of 8% in 1998. 
According to this scenario monetization will not increase as public confidence will be 
undermined by the lack of positive developments in the real sphere and in the banking 
sector. As a result, without endangering the already attained macroeconomic stability 
and putting the exchange rate under hazard, the monetary authorities manage only to 
increase domestic money by 10%.  
In this scenario inflation hardly falls (from 8.5% to 8.4%). The prices grow fast 
in the first quarter as a result of the monetary overhang from the previous year, and 
also due to a seasonal fall in GDP which contributes to a lower money demand and 
growth of the money velocity. We expect a standard (so far) seasonal fall of prices in 
June and July, and a subsequent gradual increase in the last quarter. The nominal GDP 
projection is 8097 mln. lari for 1998. 
We forecast a slight decline of a monetization level in this scenario (0.1% since 
June 1996). The reason for this is the necessity of a tight monetary policy in 1998. 
Without reserves for monetary base growth, M2 can increase mainly with the increase 
of the money multiplier. Its growth is doubtful without substantial improvement in 
banking sector efficiency. 
7.2.2. Optimistic Scenario 
In the optimistic scenario real GDP growth will accelerate to 11% annually. As a 
result of the consequent reforms the real demand for money will increase. The 
monetary authorities will manage to expand the M2 aggregate by 21% without 
violating the aim of reducing inflation. Annual inflation will fall to 7.2% and most of M. Jarociński, A. Jirny 
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the price growth will happen in the first quarter, as a lagged result of the Central Bank 
foreign reserve buildup in the second half of 1997, reinforced by the seasonal fall in 
GDP. Monetization will increase slightly, but still will not reach even the modest level 
of 4%. It seems that one has to wait longer for a significant growth of this variable. 
The details of the forecasts are presented in the Table 4. 
8. Conclusions 
General macroeconomic situation provides grounds for cautious optimism. 
Inflation is falling and the exchange rate is stable while at the same time the real 
growth is remarkably fast and its base is widening. It means that it is a healthy revival 
and not the result of artificial overheating. Further progress in privatization is 
necessary to create the foundations for long run growth. Success in a fight against 
widespread corruption in local authorities and tax services would be necessary to 
diminish the share of the shadow economy and ensure, that economic growth 
contributes more to remonetization. 
Reforms in the banking sector are underway and they should be pursued further, 
so that the situation in the financial sector normalizes. 
Fiscal constraint is the biggest threat to the stability of the macroeconomic 
situation. The inability of the state to mobilize sufficient revenue increases pressures 
on the National Bank. Special Parliament decisions force it to give special credits or 
guarantees. As a result, the international reserves, which are fundamental to market 
confidence, are being depleted. Such a situation only contributes to low monetization. 
The 1998 budget should be realistic rather than optimistic. If the revenue performance 
is much lower than expected and at least a part of the financing gap is translated into 
another pressures on the NBG’s international reserves, the danger of de-stabilization is 
not worth the possible gains from even the most reasonable budget outlays. The long 
run solution is to improve the fiscal revenue performance. Stability of inflation and the 
exchange rate cannot be regarded as achieved until Georgia can finance a sustainable 
level of government expenditures from tax revenues. 
We find it quite possible to reach an even lower rate of inflation than was 
originally projected. This would be an important development, since attaining lower 
inflation would result in reducing the price growth inertia. As the experience of many 
transition economies shows, such inertia emerges easily and afterwards is costly to 
overcome. Georgia faces a rare possibility of avoiding this scenario. 
Our forecasts are not excessively optimistic in terms of a projected growth of the 
level of monetization. After the unfortunate hyperinflation episode the money demand 
is likely to rebuild only very gradually. An extremely cautious monetary and exchange 
rate policy in the coming years seems to be the only remedy. Monetary Policy and Inflation in Georgia 1996-1998 
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Appendix: Database and the Econometric Model   
Used in Construction of the Forecasts 
Below we present the data used and the econometric estimations. The length of 
the data series is very short and the quality of the available data (except for the 
monetary aggregates) is low. In these conditions any econometric results should be 
treated very cautiously. At the present stage the model is capable of providing 
reasonable short run forecasts, but in medium term forecasting its reliability is only 
hypothetical. The model is being developed and, as longer time series become 
available and the quality of the data improves, it is likely to undergo further changes. 
1. Data Base 
1.1. Statistical Data 
Nominal GDP (PY) in current prices. 
There exist several different estimates of nominal GDP, with a different degree 
of reliability. We used the following two: 
￿  IMF estimates, annual, after: Georgia Recent Economic Developments, IMF, 
February 1997. 
￿  State Department of Statistics (SDS) quarterly Production Based data, which 
include some estimates of unrecorded activity (shadow economy). Shadow 
economy correction amounts to increasing the official data by several percent. 
The correction is not applied consequently ￿ it differs every year, varying from 
12% of the official economy in 1995 and 33% in 1996 to 40% in 1997. 
Production Based Georgian GDP figure is a relatively rough estimate but we 
assume that it conveys some of the quarterly dynamics of economic activity 
during the year. 
SDS started to set up and publish also consumption based GDP figures, which 
are regarded as more reliable. However, they are only annual and they exist only for 
the year 1996. Therefore, to preserve consistency of the series, we turned to the IMF 
estimates. 
Consumer price index (CPI), monthly, calculated by the SDS. This data is also 
relatively inexact and the technology of price measurement is currently being 
improved. 
M2 ￿ Broad money in domestic currency, monthly,  from the Monetary 
Survey prepared by the National Bank of Georgia, Department of Macro-Analysis. We 
also tested other aggregates, such as  currency in circulation or M3, but M2 proved to 
be most significant in the equations. 
Index of Industrial Production, monthly, calculated by the SDS. It shows 
changes in the real value of industrial production in a given month, relative to the M. Jarociński, A. Jirny 
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same month of the previous year. For the year 1996 there exists also an index 
reflecting changes relative to the previous month. This enabled us to construct a series 
IIP with a single base, equal to 1 in December 1995. 
Information abut the data is summarized in the table below: 
series name  units  frequency  source 
PY - IMF  GEL millions  annual  IMF Recent Economic Developments 
PY - SDS  GEL thousands  quarterly  SDS 
CPI  index, base Dec.95  monthly  SDS 
M2  GEL thousands  monthly  NBG - Monetary Survey 
IIP  index, base Dec.95  monthly  SDS, calculations of the authors 
The data cover the years 1995, 1996 and the first half of 1997. 
Actually, it is possible to obtain data for a longer period. However, we decided to 
start our analysis from 1995, when inflation subsided and some economic stabilization 
had already been reached. The earlier data is also subject to a much wider margin of 
error, because of historical events underway in Georgia and the resulting difficult 
conditions in which statistics was gathered. 
1.2. Series used in the estimations 
Because of the relatively short period covered it is necessary to use maximum 
possible frequency data - the monthly series, to have more observations. Therefore, we 
had to construct an approximation of monthly nominal GDP, because such statistic is 
not calculated in Georgia. We used the SDS data on nominal output and industrial 
production to break down the annual IMF figures into quarterly and monthly series. In 
construction of real GDP (denoted below as Y) we used the CPI as a deflator. 




meaning units  obtained: 
Y  real GDP index  GEL millions  PY divided by the CPI index 
CPI  CPI index  index, base 
Dec.95 
SDS 
M2  broad domestic money  GEL thousands  NBG - Monetary Survey 
DCOUP  dummy for the period when 
coupons were in circulation 
-  Jan.95-Sep.95 equal to 1               
0 - afterwards 
DSEAS  seasonal effect on inflation  -  equals 1 in June and July, 0 in 
remaining months 
TRD9607  linear trend  -  Jan.95-June 96 equal to 1.     
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2. Money Demand Equation 
The money demand equation was estimated as follows: 




































Apart from the variables whose presence is explained by the general theory of 
money demand there are two more, a dummy variable DCOUP and a linear trend. 
They are introduced in order to reflect specific Georgian conditions. 
2.1. Dummy Variable for the Coupon Period 
DCOUP is a dummy variable. It is equal to 1 before introduction of the new 
national currency (lari) and 0 after that. Prior to October 1995 coupons were used as a 
national currency and public confidence in them was low. For current transactions 
population often used US dollars and Russian rubles. Introduction of the lari changed 
the money market seriously, so we reflected it with a shift variable. 
2.2. Remonetization Trend in the Equation 
If trend is not included in the money demand equation, the residuals at the end of 
the estimation period are constantly positive. This suggests that some processes in the 
economy which lead to an increase in the money demand are left out of the 
estimations. Possible examples of such processes are: a gradual growth of a public 
confidence in the lari, a gradual change in peoples habits with respect to liquidity 
management or an impact of the banking sector reform and money multiplier growth. 
To include this effect we introduced a trend into the money demand equation. 
The trend beginning in July 97 proved to be most significant in the estimations. It is 
introduced after taking logarithm because other variables are in logs too. If introduced 
directly, it would amount to an exponential trend with respect to M2/CPI, which is not 
especially plausible and certainly not suitable for forecasts. 
2.3. Sample Period 
A sample consists of two parts: the coupon period and the lari period. Situation 
in September and October 1995 was quite unique. These two observations, as outliers, 
had quite a dramatic influence on the estimated coefficients. Therefore, we decided to 
reject these two months as conveying an information on exceptional phenomena of the 
currency change moment, which do not contribute much to studying money demand 
behaviour in ￿normal￿ periods. M. Jarociński, A. Jirny 
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2.4. Results of the Estimation 
Below are the results of the estimation
21 (see also Figure 5.) 
Dependent Variable is LOG(M2/CPI) 
Sample(adjusted): 1995:02 1995:08 1995:11 1997:06 
Included observations: 27 after adjusting endpoints 
 
Variable Coefficient Std.  Error t-Statistic  Prob. 
C 5.961 0.252 23.616  0.000
LOG(Y) 0.165 0.031 5.385  0.000
D(LOG(CPI(-1))) -0.501 0.177 -2.829 0.010
DCOUP -1.084 0.020 -53.169  0.000
LOG(TRD9607) 0.070 0.008 8.295  0.000
 
R-squared 0.996
Adjusted R-squared  0.995
Durbin-Watson stat  1.566
 
As expected, real GDP influences money demand positively, but the elasticity of 
the latter with respect to the former turned out to be low. This might be a result of the 
fact, that shadow economy estimates have a significant share in the total growth 
figures. Growth of the shadow sector can influence monetization less, because 
probably gross of business transactions in this sphere are made in cash dollars. Part of 
the GDP growth impact is also contained in the trend coefficient. 
Inflation decreases real money demand. The first lag of inflation proved to be 
more significant than the contemporary value or any longer distributed lag structure. 
Obviously, demand for money was lower before introduction of the lari than after it, 
which is reflected in the negative value of the coefficient of the DCOUP dummy. 
Trend coefficient is significant and positive. 
The fit is good, which is however not so impressing, as the equation is in levels. 
Also, in light of some autocorrelation in errors, reflected by the Durbin-Watson 
statistics, the t-values should be interpreted cautiously. We do not treat this problem as 
serious, as the nature of the equation is of a long run type, and its main purpose is to 
obtain errors for the Error Correction Mechanism that we introduce in the short run 
equation. 
3. Dynamic CPI Equation 
The second equation is the dynamic CPI equation (see Figure 6.). Monthly 
percentage change in the CPI is the dependent variable. 
We suppose, that if the CPI differs from its equilibrium value, the economy will 
tend to move towards the equilibrium. Therefore, we introduce a lagged difference 
between the equilibrium and the actual values of the CPI to the dynamic equation. It 
                                              
21 In this place, as well as in the following sections we present a standard output of Econometric 
Views - a program in which the estimations were conducted. D(x) denotes the first difference of a 
variable x: xt-xt-1 and LOG(x) means a natural logarithm of x (with the base equal to Euler’s e). Monetary Policy and Inflation in Georgia 1996-1998 
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bears an analogy to Granger’s Error Correction Mechanism, but here errors are not 
applied to a differenced original equation, but to a new one. 
Second regressor is a change in money supply. Second lag proved to be most 
significant. 
A seasonal dummy variable is introduced to take into account the effect of 
summer food price falls on inflation, which are most visible in June and July. 
Monthly inflation rate is also often autocorrelated, either because of some price 
growth inertia, or because of a persistence of some fundamental factors not captured in 
the equation. Therefore, the first lag of inflation is introduced. 
 
Dependent Variable is D(LOG(CPI)) 
Date: 07/29/97 Time: 16:26 
Sample(adjusted): 1995:11 1997:06 
Included observations: 20 after adjusting endpoints 
 
Variable Coefficient Std.  Error t-Statistic  Prob. 
C 0.009 0.002 4.064  0.001
LOG(PST(-1))-LOG(CPI(-1)) 0.164 0.051 3.210  0.006
D(LOG(M2(-2))) 0.030 0.009 3.333  0.005
DSEAS -0.029 0.006 -5.061  0.000
D(LOG(CPI(-1))) 0.133 0.063 2.105  0.053
 
R-squared 0.759
Adjusted R-squared  0.694
Durbin-Watson stat  1.199
 
Above, PST denotes the equilibrium CPI, calculated in the previous equation. 
The error correction coefficient implies that it takes about 5 months to reduce a gap 
between the equilibrium CPI and the actual one by half (it can be checked in a 
straightforward way with a spreadsheet). 
Monetary emissions influence inflation positively with an average lag of 2 
months. For simple practical inferences it has to be corrected by the lagged money 
supply influence contained in the equilibrium CPI factor (first regressor), and inflation 
autocorrelation, which is also significant and positive. 
To study the meaning of equation coefficients, experiments can be conducted to 
isolate the influence of single variables on the forecasts. In such tests coefficients are 
applied to an artificial data set, and the resulting fitted values are calculated. 
Reasonable thing is to start with the values of experimental data which imply that the 
model is in equilibrium in the first period, i.e. price level is stable. Then one can 
observe impacts of shocks to single variables while the other ones remain unchanged. 
In Figure 7. we present graphically a result of a money supply shock: a 50 mln. lari 
increase of M2 in period 0, while all other variables remain unchanged. Seasonal 
effects are neglected, to make the picture more clear. 
The peak of inflation resulting from money emission happens after 2 months, 
although an effect in the first and third months is also strong. Subsequently the 
inflation subsides. It diminishes slowly, as a result of a gradual adjustment to the new 
equilibrium value and of the autocorrelation in inflation, i.e. the inflation inertia. M. Jarociński, A. Jirny 
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4. Price Shocks 
During the covered period, some of the specific goods and groups of goods in 
Georgia have experienced exogenous price shocks, resulting for example from 
administrative price increases. However, the analysis done by the authors did not show 
any significant effect of these price shocks on the overall CPI index. The most obvious 
reason for this fact is that usually the cause for administrative price increases was an 
increase in prices for non-controlled goods, and consequent rise in costs of keeping the 
controlled prices unchanged. 
To study the effect of the price shocks, we used a breakdown of the overall CPI 
into 6 main groups of goods. We constructed 6 variables, equal to the differences 
between price indices for specific groups of goods and a weighted average of indices 
for remaining goods. Subsequently, we constructed an overall price shock variable, 
equal to the weighted average of the 6 specific price shock indices. However, this 
aggregated price shock variable did not prove to be significant when introduced into 
the dynamic CPI equation. 
5. The System of Equations 
The model described above is actually represented by a set of equations: 
M2=ScenarioForM2 (1) 
Y=ScenarioForY (2) 
PST=exp(LOG(M2)-( 5.960805 + 0.16460235*LOG(Y) -                      
0.50134208*D(LOG(CPI(-1))) + 0.070127963*LOG(TRD9607)))  (3) 
D(LOG(CPI)) = 0.0090300719 + 0.16448364*(LOG(PST0(-1))-LOG(CPI(-1))) + 




In the equations, the reader will recognize the coefficients from the estimated 
regressions. After assuming scenarios for exogenous variables the system can be 
solved forward for forecasts. 
6. Summary 
In construction of the model we took into account the specificity of Georgian 
economy and the course of developments in the examined period. The availability of 
data has also been a guideline in designing the model, as it is designated for practical 
purposes. Data limitations have been dealt with in a way the authors found optimal. 
All coefficients have the a priori expected signs. This indicates that the model 
captures relationships that are grounded in economic theory. Durbin-Watson value, 
indicates that specification of the dynamic equation is still not perfect. Money demand Monetary Policy and Inflation in Georgia 1996-1998 
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elasticity with respect to real GDP is lower than expected, which may be a result of a 
shadow economy growth. 
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Tables and Figures 
Table 1 
M2, CPI inflation, monetization and the money multiplier. 
     M2  CPI inflation monetization  multiplier***
quarter  date  lari th.  % change  quarterly* average**  
Q4  Dec. 94  37 609   
Q1  Mar. 95  33 570  -11% 10.4%   0.012    0.79
Q2  Jun. 95  37 506  12% 2.8%   0.011    0.73
Q3  Sep. 95  48 815  30% 8.4%   0.012    0.99
Q4  Dec. 95  157 645  223% 27.8%   0.035    0.017  1.02
Q1  Mar. 96  150 571  -4% 9.4%   0.032    0.022  0.97
Q2  Jun. 96  176 181  17% 2.4%   0.030    0.027  1.02
Q3  Sep. 96  202 038  15% -0.9%   0.031    0.032  0.97
Q4  Dec. 96  217 952  8% 2.5%   0.038    0.033  1.04
Q1  Mar. 97  205 068  -6% 3.6%   0.036    0.034  1.02
Q2  Jun. 97  215 562  5% -0.6%   0.031    0.034  1.04
* Calculated as the end quarter M2 divided by annualized quarterly GDP. 
** Moving average of the previous measure over the preceding 4 quarters. 
*** M2 divided by reserve money. 
Sources: NBG Monetary Survey (M2), Accounts of the NBG (Reserve Money for multiplier 
calculation), State Departement of Statistics (CPI), IMF estimates of the annual GDP (for calculation 
of monetization), calculations and estimates of the authours. 
Table 2 
Main items of the NBG balance sheet and their quarterly changes, in 
thousands of lari* 





quarter date  end  period  change  end period change  end period  change 
Q4  Dec. 94  6 446  36 618 43 064 
Q1  Mar. 95  -12 215  -18 661 54 593 17 975 42 378  -686
Q2  Jun. 95  3 828  16 043 47 382 -7 211 51 210  8 832
Q3  Sep. 95  -26 830  -30 657 75 950 28 568 49 120  -2 090
Q4  Dec. 95  90 837  117 667 62 977 -12 973 153 814  104 694
Q1  Mar. 96  50 346  -40 491 105 281 42 304 155 627  1 813
Q2  Jun. 96  53 343  2 997 119 760 14 479 173 103  17 476
Q3  Sep. 96  9 291  -44 052 198 984 79 224 208 276  35 173
Q4  Dec. 96  -523  -9 815 209 483 10 499 208 960  684
Q1  Mar. 97  -99 219  -98 696 299 491 90 008 200 272  -8 688
Q2  Jun. 97  -160 118  -60 899 368 283 68 792 208 165  7 893
* By accounting identity: NFA+NDA=RM, dNFA+dNDA=dRM (d denotes nominal change). 
Source: Accounts of the National Bank of Georgia (NBG). M. Jarociński, A. Jirny 
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Table 3 
Lari/dollar exchange rate and the NBG intervention on TICEX 
Date  lari/dollar 
exchange rate 
NBG sales of 
dollars ($ th.) 
NBG purchase of 
dollars ($ th.) 
NBG net sales of 
dollars ($ th.) 
Sep 95  1.30  6 776 0 6 776
Oct 95  1.27  185 6 749 -6 564
Nov 95  1.25  1 767 660 1 107
Dec 95  1.25  1 785 1 848 -64
Jan 96  1.24  7 731 0 7 731
Feb 96  1.25  11 947 0 11 947
Mar 96  1.26  8 218 0 8 218
Apr 96  1.26  3 942 151 3 791
May 96  1.26  4 915 0 4 915
Jun 96  1.26  2 616 397 2 219
Jul 96  1.26  4 499 1 484 3 015
Aug 96  1.26  6 049 0 6 049
Sep 96  1.27  8 260 0 8 260
Oct 96  1.27  20 223 0 20 223
Nov 96  1.27  15 578 0 15 578
Dec 96  1.28  5 910 528 5 382
Jan 97  1.28  15 100 0 15 100
Feb 97  1.29  8 140 258 7 882
Mar 97  1.29  7 383 40 7 343
Apr 97  1.30  7 436 0 7 436
May 97  1.30  9 372 0 9 372
Jun 97  1.30  1 765 5 450 -3 686
Source: National Bank of Georgia. 
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Table 4 
Forecasts* of the CPI inflation and the nominal GDP based on the 
pessimistic and the optimistic scenario. 
  Optimistic scenario  Pessimistic scenario 
Date CPI  GDP CPI GDP 
 Index  base 
Dec.95 




% change Nominal 
(mln. lari) 
1996  113.80  13.8%  5 724 113.80 13.8% 5 724 
1997  123.49  8.5%  6 747 123.49 8.5% 6 747 
1998  133.86  8.4%  8 097 132.35 7.2% 8 231 
1997 Q1  117.90  3.6%  1 002 117.90 3.6% 1 002 
1997 Q2  117.23  -0.6%  1 556 117.23 -0.6% 1 556 
1997 Q3  117.72  0.4%  2 028 117.72 0.4% 2 028 
1997 Q4  123.49  4.9%  2 161 123.49 4.9% 2 161 
1998 Q1  132.44  7.3%  1 197 131.02 6.1% 1 223 
1998 Q2  132.89  0.3%  1 915 131.07 0.0% 1 939 
1998 Q3  130.43  -1.9%  2 437 129.04 -1.6% 2 479 
1998 Q4  133.86  2.6%  2 548 132.35 2.6% 2 589 
Jan.97 114.70  0.8%  326.6 114.70 0.8% 326.6 
Feb.97 117.10  2.1%  328.3 117.10 2.1% 328.3 
Mar.97 117.90  0.7%  346.6 117.90 0.7% 346.6 
Apr.97 118.30  0.3%  507.2 118.30 0.3% 507.2 
May.97 119.50  1.0%  535.4 119.50 1.0% 535.4 
Jun.97 117.23  -1.9%  513.4 117.23 -1.9% 513.4 
Jul.97 116.07  -1.0%  693.3 116.07 -1.0% 693.3 
Aug.97 116.31  0.2%  649.5 116.31 0.2% 649.5 
Sep.97 117.72  1.2%  684.9 117.72 1.2% 684.9 
Oct.97 119.62  1.6%  707.4 119.62 1.6% 707.4 
Nov.97 121.58  1.6%  717.3 121.58 1.6% 717.3 
Dec.97 123.49  1.6%  736.5 123.49 1.6% 736.5 
Jan.98 125.31  1.5%  385.3 125.31 1.5% 396.0 
Feb.98 129.05  3.0%  390.7 128.44 2.5% 399.7 
Mar.98 132.44  2.6%  420.6 131.02 2.0% 427.6 
Apr.98 135.33  2.2%  626.7 133.40 1.8% 634.9 
May.98 136.37  0.8%  659.9 134.18 0.6% 667.3 
Jun.98 132.89  -2.5%  628.5 131.07 -2.3% 637.1 
Jul.98 129.60  -2.5%  836.0 128.28 -2.1% 850.5 
Aug.98 129.57  0.0%  781.4 128.35 0.1% 795.6 
Sep.98 130.43  0.7%  819.6 129.04 0.5% 833.4 
Oct.98 131.56  0.9%  840.3 130.01 0.8% 853.5 
Nov.98 132.75  0.9%  845.9 131.13 0.9% 858.8 
Dec.98 133.86  0.8%  862.3 132.35 0.9% 876.2 
*The forecasts (values of the variables starting with July 97) are printed in italic. 
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Figure 3 
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Figure 5 
Estimation of real money demand: actual, fitted values from the estimated 


























96:01 96:04 96:07 96:10 97:01 97:04
Residual Actual Fitted
 Monetary Policy and Inflation in Georgia 1996-1998 
S&A No. 114  33
Figure 7 
Experiment: an isolated effect of a big money emission (50 mln. lari) on 
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